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Hazard communication by volcanologists:
Part 1 - Framing the case for
contextualisation and related quality
standards in volcanic hazard assessments
Richard J. Bretton1* , Joachim Gottsmann1 and Ryerson Christie2
Abstract
Scientific communication is one of the most challenging aspects of volcanic risk management because the
complexities and uncertainties of volcanic unrest make it difficult for scientists to provide information that is
timely, relevant, easily comprehensible and trusted. When poorly handled, scientific communication can cause
social, economic and political problems, and undermine community confidence in disaster management regimes.
This is the first of two related papers that together investigate the interface between the scientific consideration
of volcanic hazards and the governance of volcanic risks. Both papers are principally concerned with issues of risk
governance, and their focus is hazard communication by volcanologists at this hazard-risk interface (the interface)
during periods of volcanic unrest. In this paper, we argue that the working practices of contextualisation must be
more methodical and propose four quality assurance standards that will enhance hazard assessments.
To improve hazard communication between volcanologists and risk-mitigation decision-makers (decision-makers),
we argue that volcanologists need to adopt a more iterative and structured approach that openly embraces the
benefits, and confronts the challenges, of stakeholder-orientated ‘contextualisation’.
Our analysis of the published literature reveals evidence of a slow paradigm shift from practices based upon strict
linear technocratic approaches to more iterative stakeholder participation. The extent of this shift varies in different
regions, however, the rules and practices of deliberation often appear ad hoc and unstructured.
Since there is currently insufficient guidance for managing the practicalities and standards of contextualisation,
we introduce two novel concepts; the ‘scrutiny dimension’ of risk governance, which is the slow changing governance
context that may influence the processes of contextualisation, and the dynamic ‘equilibrium of contextualisation’, which
is the metastable product of regulatory standards, natural and organisational constraints, and stakeholder pressures.
We argue that the working practices of contextualisation must be more structured and should strive to be open,
transparent and fully articulated. Contextualisation, which meets proposed quality assurance standards of materiality,
proximity, comprehensibility and integrity, will enhance hazard assessments and, thereby, the utility of their outputs.
In our second paper (Bretton et al, J Appl. Volcanol. DOI 10.1186/s13617-018-0079-8, 2018), the focus is directed away
from the perceived qualities of more ‘socially robust’ hazard assessments towards the actual process of
contextualisation.
Keywords: Hazard, Risk, Risk governance, Communication, Deliberation, Contextualisation
* Correspondence: richard.bretton@bristol.ac.uk
1School of Earth Sciences, University of Bristol, Wills Memorial Building,
Queens Road, Bristol BS8 1RJ, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2018 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2018) 7:9 
https://doi.org/10.1186/s13617-018-0077-x
Introduction
This is the first of two related papers1 that together
investigate the interface between the scientific consider-
ation of volcanic hazards and the governance of volcanic
risks. Both papers are principally concerned with issues
of risk governance, and their focus is hazard communi-
cation by volcanologists at this hazard-risk interface (the
interface) during periods of volcanic unrest. In this
paper, we argue that the working practices of contextual-
isation must be more structured and propose four
quality assurance standards that will enhance hazard
assessments. In our second paper, the focus is directed
away from the perceived qualities of more ‘socially
robust’ hazard assessments towards the actual process of
contextualisation.
During periods of volcanic unrest, significant practical
challenges of timing, relevance, comprehensibility and
trust exist for volcanologists operating at the interface
that was described by Jolly and Cronin (2014) as the
“science-management interface”. Periods of unrest not
only create uncertainty about what is happening in a
physical sense but also increase demands for scientific
analysis, information and advice (Johnston et al. 2002).
Analysis of volcanic unrest often involves the character-
isation of the physical, temporal and spatial parameters
of future scenarios, with a typical analytical product
being a hazard map. The overall objective is to answer
foreseeable questions from decision-makers involved in
risk mitigation. These questions will include multiple
variations of ‘What’ (physical parameters of chemical
composition, heat, size, flux, weight, speed, etc.), ‘When’
and ‘For how long’ (temporal parameters), and ‘Where’
(spatial parameters both horizontal and vertical).
Scientific communication is one of the most challenging
aspects of volcanic risk management (Marti 2015) because
it must address issues of both knowledge and ignorance
(e.g. uncertainties, errors, absences of knowledge and
other forms of non-knowledge). The issues involve: (1)
aleatory uncertainty due to the inherent variability or
randomness of volcanic hazards that often involve
dynamic, complex and non-linear processes2; (2) epi-
stemic uncertainty due to constraints upon our under-
standing, our information (e.g. inadequate or uncertain
data used to drive and evaluate models), and our resources
(e.g. computing or time for reflection); (3) interpretative
and deliberative human processes and subjective choices3;
and (4) as a result of the first three, the foreseeable possi-
bility of legitimate and responsible scientific disagreement
such as was allegedly evident during the volcanic incidents
in Guadeloupe (1976), St Vincent (1979) and Mount St
Helens, Washington, USA (2004) (Fiske 1984; Driedger
et al. 2008; Frenzen and Matarrese 2008).
When faced with scientific uncertainties and juggling
societal and political pressures, decision-makers frequently
request certainty, precision, accuracy and unambiguous
consensus from their expert advisers (McGuire and Kilburn
1997; Paton et al. 1998, 1999, 2000; WBGU 2000; Aspinall
2011; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2012; Jolly and Cronin
2014). The implications of the preceding discussion, how-
ever, are that no representation of a volcanic hazard can be
entirely certain, precise, complete, simple or objective. Fur-
thermore, the stakes for at-risk communities are high, given
that communications of scientific knowledge, when poorly
handled, can cause social, economic and political problems,
even if the identified hazards do not lead imminently to
physical consequences such as an eruption (Johnston et al.
2002). There is thus a constant risk that community
confidence in disaster management regimes could be
undermined (Christie et al. 2015).
Contextualisation is the term used in this paper to
describe the critical process of interactions between vol-
canologists and risk governance decision-makers and,
specifically, the tailoring of hazard assessments to ensure
they are driven by the needs of decision-makers. We
start from the contention that effective contextualisation
is achieved when volcanologists provide timely hazard
assessments that are relevant, easily understood and
trusted. Furthermore, our investigation of communica-
tion practicalities was conducted at an important mo-
ment – the immediate aftermath of the L’Aquila trial
and during a period of evolving international law norms
and disaster risk management initiatives. We hypothesise
that the L’Aquila trial identified a failure of contextual-
isation within a risk governance process and we argue in
this paper that volcanologists need to adopt an approach
that openly embraces the benefits and confronts the
challenges of contextualisation if they are to improve
hazard communication at the interface.
Choices of terminology, theoretical models and
assumptions
For the sake of brevity and clarity, we draw upon the
existing rich discourse on relevant terminology and
adopt the working definitions in Additional file 1.
We:
1. Differentiate in both theory and practice between
the overall governance of the risks associated with
natural hazards (risk governance), and those parts
of risk governance that require the services of
volcanologists (hazard assessments).
2. Do not seek to challenge the discourse that compares
objective/innocent/science-right and constructivist/
democratic/right-science approaches to risk
governance (e.g. US/NRC 1996; Grabill and
Simmons 1998) but argue that it is incomplete
in several respects.
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3. Argue that, in the absence of readily accessible
alternatives, many of the concepts and values that
are currently framed principally in the context of
risk governance can, and should be, used to
enhance hazard assessments.
4. Deliberately avoid use of the expression “end-users”
to describe decision-makers receiving science-based
services. Given that we argue in favour of the
planned and integrated contextualisation of services
throughout the cycle of their production and
delivery (not just at the ‘end’ of a linear production
process), we acknowledge the inadequacy of this
misleading expression. Alternative expressions, such
as “collaborators”, “co-producers” and “partners”,
have other weaknesses.
5. Assume that, in most countries, volcanologists do
not normally lead risk governance efforts, but
instead undertake hazard assessments and
contribute hazard knowledge and, if requested,
related advice.
6. Accept the possibility of an unintended Anglo-Saxon,
Anglo-USA and/or Western Hemisphere bias due to
the authors’ limited knowledge of the legal frameworks
operative in many volcanic regions of the world.
Future investigations involving lawyers practising in,
inter alia, Iceland, South-East Asia, Latin and South
America, Africa, and Japan would provide helpful
complementary research.
Distinct approaches to communication lie at the heart
of competing theories of risk governance and, if we are
to arrive at a reasoned and coherent approach, we must
be clear about: (1) the respective roles of volcanologists
and decision-makers within hazard assessments; (2) the
factors driving the quality of associations between volca-
nologists and decision-makers; and (3) the likely
sentiments (such as confidence and trust) and actions
(such as risk-mitigation decisions) within those associa-
tions. Our choices in respect of the above have a direct
effect on the way we address the underlying purposes
and goals of the processes and outputs of volcanic haz-
ard analysis and thus also on the way we address the de-
sign of those processes4.
We adopt an holistic approach to risk governance,
accepting that it involves the convergence of physical,
societal and managerial dimensions (Cardona 2004).
Acknowledgement of the existence of a managerial
dimension encourages identification of decision-makers
and what hazard and risk knowledge they need. To
provide a coherent risk governance model that recog-
nises the paramount importance of effective risk
decision-making, we adopt a weak constructivist ap-
proach after accepting a positivist conception of risk and
democratic approach to cultural bias. These terms are
considered in greater detail in Additional file 2 and
shown in italics whenever used.
In the absence of a positivist conception of risk, it
would be difficult to justify the monitoring of volcanoes
to produce hazard knowledge. The ambitious claim of
risk is that ‘past’ parameters must be investigated
because the past may enhance analyses of the present
and forecasts of the future.
The word ‘weak’ is critical to the very basis upon
which volcanic hazards are monitored and analysed. It is
accepted that such hazards exist as objective physical
phenomena capable of analysis. ‘Present' dynamic pa-
rameters can and should be monitored, analysed, quanti-
fied and communicated but, since we accept that risk is
a social construction incorporating physical and societal
dimensions, decision-makers’ perceptions and under-
standings are not only relevant but also critical because
they are directly related to, and will influence, their sen-
timents and actions.
In using the constructivist actor-network approach, we
appreciate that it is important to seek evidence of ‘asso-
ciations’ and ‘effects’ (Callon 1986a, 1986b; Latour 1987,
1999a, 1999b; Law 1992, 1999). The effectiveness or
value of a hazard communication is derived from, and is
a consequence of, the actions and sentiments of its
recipients – in other words - its “effects”. Consistent with
the social constructivist choice that we have made, a
democratic approach to cultural bias is adopted. This em-
phasis on the centrality of what we might call the
reception of hazard communication implies that
volcanologists are not entitled to claim an intrinsic status
of privilege, dominance or superiority as may be assumed
in technocratic and decisionist models of risk governance.
Communication is also central to the iterative non-lin-
ear approach that we favour for both hazard and risk
knowledge production. Effective communication re-
quires deliberative processes, and deliberation is in turn
the precursor to, and the driver of, contextualisation.
We reject both realistic approaches and conventional
linear governance models that do not place communica-
tion centrally within every part of the governance
process. A relativist approach is preferred by us because
we accept that hazard knowledge: (1) can never be either
entirely objective or value free; (2) can and should be in-
fluenced by societal contexts and managerial norms
within openly discussed and agreed constraints; and (3)
should be the decision-maker or “audience” (Leonard
et al. 2014, 227) focussed product of iterative analytical-
deliberative hazard assessments.
It is important to emphasise the link between context-
ualisation and relativist/interpretivist approaches to
communication. Contextualisation (or ‘socialisation’),
which demands communications that are interactional,
situational, episodic and improvised (Pacanowsky and
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O’Donnell-Trujillo 1983), is one way in which the design of
hazard assessments can be changed in order to influence
their effects. Through the empirical study of effects, it is
possible to measure the efficacy of the overall scientific con-
tribution, and thus the strengths and weaknesses of the
associations between volcanologists and decision-makers.
Nonetheless, it is readily accepted that any measurement of
effects may be very difficult in practice.
For the purposes of this paper, we argue that the dis-
course that compares objective/innocent/science-right and
constructivist/interpretivist/democratic/right-science ap-
proaches to risk communication is incomplete in several
ways. It pays insufficient regard to the status of the hazard
element of risk – risk being the convolution of elements of
hazard, exposure and vulnerability. Within the weak con-
structivist approach that we adopt, whilst overall risk may
be a social construct and susceptible to negotiation using
participatory processes (“a subject world”), the natural
hazard element is a physical real-world phenomenon (“an
object world”) requiring expert scientific assessments, al-
beit assessments requiring subjective choices (Birkmann
et al. 2015, 236). In both theory and practice5, there is
therefore a tension between the subjective/normative and
objective/descriptive elements of risk (Longino 1993;
Schwandt 20006) and, with reference to the terminology
of the US/NRC (1996), there is room for conflict between
the concepts of “getting the science right”, measured by
standards of scientific adequacy, and “getting the right sci-
ence”, which requires standards of utility.
We address the persistent failure by risk governance
commentators to investigate methodically and holistically
the challenges related to the production and communica-
tion of hazard knowledge, having focussed instead upon
the negotiated construction and communication of risk,
or a single feature of hazard communication such as
‘understandability’ or ‘trust’. Insufficient attention has
been given to the drivers of the associations between
volcanologists and decision-makers and the possible influ-
ence of regulatory and non-scientific pressures. The
challenges, to which we refer, raise complex issues of
‘negotiation’, that are demonstrably real, quantifiable and
potentially significant, and therefore should be mitigated.
Introducing the ‘scrutiny dimension’ of risk
Within social constructivist models the concept of risk
has at least three overlapping functions. Risks, like haz-
ards, are objects of governance which must be quantified
to facilitate their integration for decision-making pur-
poses. Secondly, risk is a methodology by which future
volcanic uncertainties can be managed. Thirdly, the
methodology of risk has a normative (i.e. ethical) dimen-
sion and definable norms, standards and expectations –
in other words, quality standards that circumscribe, and
direct the conduct appropriate for a given situation.
These standards can also be used as tools to monitor
performance and apportion blame. ‘Actual conduct’
(including quantifications of the parameters of hazard,
exposure and vulnerability) can be measured against
‘right conduct’ in a situation in which a decision-maker
must consider numerous possible actions and decide
what should be done (IRGC 2009; Ben-Ari and Or-Chen
2009; Walker et al. 2010; Thompson 2012). It follows
that risk is the mother of its unintended offspring, the
scrutiny dimension that we now introduce.
We adopt and build upon the ‘physical’, ‘societal’ and
‘managerial’ dimensions of risk governance identified by
Cardona (2004). The last of these, which includes “man-
agement capacity and related actors”, determines the
need for, and the purpose and nature of, interactions be-
tween risk governance stakeholders (Cardona 2004, 477).
Specifically, we build on Cardona (2004) by noting
there is slow changing context in which risk manage-
ment takes place, which we refer to as the ‘scrutiny’ di-
mension. This novel fourth dimension of risk reflects
the extent to which decision-makers and their decisions
will be scrutinised and influenced by legal and other
processes that seek to promote better governance with
reference to standards set by, inter alia, international,
national and local laws, as well as less formal initiatives
and expectations. Laws create a framework of govern-
ance to order: (1) behaviour (converting governance
policies into outcomes); (2) power (defining structures,
duties and rights that distribute responsibilities and
power between many stakeholders); and (3) contestation
(providing substantive and procedural tools to promote
responsibility and accountability and to resolve disputes)
(Bretton et al. 2015, 2017; WBG 2017).
There are many potential scrutiny sources and they
include those detailed in Table 1 that are entirely exter-
nal to the stakeholders. Six potential sources of regula-
tory standards are discussed later in this paper and
summarised in Table 5.
It is the scrutiny dimension that creates management
challenges for decision-makers and may influence their
associations with, and their demands upon, volcanolo-
gists. We adopt the working hypothesis that the require-
ments of decision-makers change over several different
time-scales and that, by means of careful and effective
dialogue, they can be identified. In the short-term, the
demands may change during the many phases of a cycle
of volcanic unrest. Over longer periods, they will change
in response to actual and perceived changes in the scru-
tiny dimension.
Insufficient guidance exists for managing the practical-
ities and standards of contextualisation. We argue that
the scrutiny dimension has the potential to be the main
influence upon the demands of decision-makers and,
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thereby, the main agent behind changes to the metastable
‘equilibrium of contextualisation’, which we introduce later.
This equilibrium explains the consequences of the absence
of commonly recognised standards (norms) capable of
guiding, measuring and evolving acceptable practice -
standard equivocality - identified by Bretton et al. (2015).
Effective communication
There is a rich discourse in the field of volcanic risk gov-
ernance that identifies many factors that drive the ‘effect-
iveness’ of communication (Leonard et al. 2014; Donovan
and Oppenheimer 2014; Doyle et al. 2015; Christie et al.
2015; Mothes et al. 2015; Scolobig et al. 2017; Preuner
et al. 2017).
Based on this discourse, we accept as a working assump-
tion that different stakeholders have distinct: (1) capacities;
(2) understandings (mental models); and (3) needs and
expectations. Effective communications reflect an appreci-
ation of and, are driven by, these differences. Ineffective
communication can lead to decision-makers making
ill-informed decisions (US/NRC 1996; Solana et al. 2008)
with associated direct and indirect consequences. Recent
cases, including the L'Aquila case, have shown that legal
consequences may flow from communication inadequacies
(Lauta 2014a, 2014b; Bretton 2014, Bretton et al. 2015,
2017; Scolobig et al. 2014; Scolobig 2015; Doyle et al. 2015;
Alexander 2014a, 2014b; Bretton and Aspinall 2017).
We have identified, and seek to integrate within our
investigation of contextualisation, eight key factors that
are summarised in Table 2.
These key factors show that communication is more
likely to be effective if it is ‘tailored’ to the capacities
and needs of its recipients and, accordingly: (1) is rele-
vant to the risk-mitigation decisions that must be
made; (2) is received easily and on time; and (3) can
be understood and trusted. This tailoring, in other
words contextualisation, is an obvious and inevitable
response to the managerial dimension of risk govern-
ance. It is also evidence of a critical association be-
tween volcanologists and decision-makers. The nature
and quality of that relationship, and the tailoring it
fosters, need to be investigated carefully and are the
principal focus of the next section.
Contextualisation
Using several sub-headings, this section presents and
discusses our literature review of the theoretical basis,
evolution and practical challenges of contextualisation.
It also investigates several aspects of quality assurance.
Theoretical basis
Two extremes of knowledge production can be de-
scribed and contrasted. Mode-1 products have been de-
scribed as conventional scholarly reflections that are
Table 1 Contextualisation – Possible external sources of regulatory standards
References/Sources
International – dedicated risk reduction (RR) governance laws
International human rights and related laws such as those formulated
by the European Court of Human Rights.
Lauta (2014a, 2014b)
Bretton et al. (2015, 2017)
Scolobig (2015)
Scolobig et al. (2014, 2017)
RR initiatives championed by international entities such as the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (FRC)
and the United Nations (UN) Development Programme.
UN Hyogo Framework for Action, Building the Resilience of Nations and
Communities to Disaster 2005-2015 (UN/ISDR 2005)
IFRC/UNDR Handbook on Law and Disaster Risk Reduction (IFRC 2015)
UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2020 (UN/ISDR 2015)
National - dedicated RR governance laws
National, regional and local laws including primary legislation,
secondary regulations and tertiary codes of practice and
guidance notes.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
1988 in the USA is an example of national primary regulation.
National case law including high profile criminal and civil
law court cases.
Lauta (2014a, 2014b)
Scolobig et al. (2014, 2017)
Bretton et al. (2015, 2017)
Scolobig (2015)
Bretton and Aspinall (2017)
WBG (2017)
National – sectoral laws.
Laws regulating land development and use, building standards,
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driven by the motivations of their producers “to get the
science right” (US/NRC 1996). Detached from both so-
cial context, and political and other values, these prod-
ucts seek to characterise and predict the natural world
‘as it is’, for a separate, sequential, downstream political
management response. If any degree of contextualisation
is considered, it comes towards the end of a linear
process after the completion of analysis, is limited to
communication and does not entail an iterative process
of deliberation involving science users.
Mode-1 science is universal, invariant and abstract. In
this context, ‘abstract’ means detached from both social
context, and political and other values. It is a product of
a closed, isolated, innocent, politically dust-free and ster-
ile environment (Weinberg 1972; Douglas 1992; Beck
1992; Ravetz 1999; Horlick-Jones 1998; Nowotny 2003;
Hemlin and Rasmussen 2006).
By contrast, Mode-2 products are driven by the re-
quirements of their users. Their production and applica-
tion are contextualised by co-evolutionary processes of
Table 2 Factors that drive the effectiveness of communication
Modes of
communication
A variety of non-linear modes of communication
should be considered and more iterative models
refer to, and differentiate between, a wide range
of degrees and modes of participation.
Arnstein 1969; Gibbons 1994; Ronan et al. 2000; Cornell 2006;
Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir 2010; McCall and Peters-Guarin 2012;
Bird and Gìsladóttir 2012.
Stakeholder capacities The capacity of at-risk individuals, and the duty
holders mandated to protect them, within the
management contexts within which they must
make risk-mitigation decisions.
Cardona 2004; UN/ISDR 2015; Scolobig et al. 2017; Preuner et al. 2017.
Understandings
(Mental models)
How people understand and think about hazards
and risks.
Douglas 1992; Cardona 2004; Bostrom 2008; Christie et al. 2015;
Scolobig et al. 2017; Preuner et al. 2017.
Materiality/Relevance/
Salience
The quality of dialogue between risk management
stakeholders, and the provision of information and
advice that is relevant to risk-mitigation decisions
founded upon a mutual understanding by those
stakeholders of: (1) their respective needs,
responsibilities, functions, demands and roles, and
(2) their capacity to anticipate other stakeholders’
decision-related requirements.
Turner et al. 1986; Salas et al. 1994; Newhall et al. 1999; Crichton
1999; Cash et al. 2003; Bankoff et al. 2004; Perry et al. 2008; Newhall
et al. 1999; Ronan et al. 2000; Lipshitz et al. 2001; Paton and
Jackson 2002; Renn 2008; Jóhannesdóttir and Gísladóttir 2010;
Tierney et al. 2001; Doyle and Johnston 2011; Fischhoff 2013;
Doyle et al. 2011, 2015; Carreno et al. 2012; Fearnley et al. 2012,
Fearnley 2013; Potter et al. 2014; Jolly and Cronin 2014;
Christie et al. 2015.
Proximity/Delivery The importance of: (1) regular disseminations of
information by volcanic hazard assessors
(e.g. volcano observatories); and (2) timely exchanges
of information, both within and between advisory
and decision-making bodies. However, multiple
and divergent sources of scientific advice, with
associated uncertainties, can stifle decision-making.
Mileti and Sorensen 1990; Newhall et al. 1999; Ronan et al. 2000;
Haynes et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Paton 2008; De la Cruz-Reyna
and Tilling 2008; IRDR 2011; Doyle et al. 2011; Fearnley et al. 2012;
Fearnley 2013; Fischhoff 2013; Potter et al. 2014; Jolly and Cronin 2014.
Comprehensibility The need for careful consideration of the form
and content of hazard communications to minimise
any misinterpretation or confusion. A communication
should be in a form, and have content, from which
sufficient meaning can be extracted by the recipient
to make informed decisions.
Peterson (1988); Bernknopf et al. 1990; Gibbons et al. 1994;
Teigen and Brun 1999; Karelitz and Budescu 2004; Wilson
et al. 2007; Cronin 2008; Solana et al. 2008; Haynes
et al. 2008a, 2008b, 2008c; Budescu et al. 2009; Joslyn et al.
2009; Visschers et al. 2009; McGuire et al. 2009; Lipkus 2010;
Doyle et al. 2011; Fischhoff 2013; Doyle et al. 2014; Potter
et al. 2014; Neuberg 2015; Thompson et al. 2015.
Trust Trust is an earned attribute and may be affected
by many factors. It is important to maintain an
authoritative scientific advisory voice that is trusted
in fast-moving contexts in which decision makers
may be receiving a diverse range of mandated,
alternative and unorthodox views as well as
solicited and unsolicited advice. Qualities that may
enhance trust include reliability, competence,
openness and integrity.
Renn and Levine 1991; Siegrist and Cvekovich 2000; Frewer
et al. 2003; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003; Poortinga et al.
2004; Siegrist and Gutscher 2006; Hemlin and Rasmussen
2006, 188; Pielke 2007; Wilson et al. 2007; Eiser et al. 2009;
Renn 2008; Haynes et al. 2008b; Doyle and Johnston 2011;
Fischhoff 2013; Ulusoy 2012; Owen et al. 2013; IAVCEI 2013
Newsletter No. 4; Sparks et al. 2013; Siegrist 2014; Pierson et al. 2014;
Potter et al. 2014; Leonard et al. 2014; Donovan and Oppenheimer
2014; Doyle et al. 2015; Christie et al. 2015; Mothes et al. 2015;
Scolobig et al. 2017; Preuner et al. 2017.
Credibility/Legitimacy The adequacy of the scientific inputs based upon
processes to ensure quality, comprehensiveness,
transparency and robustness.
The perception that the production of scientific
information has been respectful of stakeholders’
divergent values and beliefs, unbiased in its
conduct, and fair in its treatment of opposing
views and interests.
Cash et al. (2003) and Sarrki et al. (2014) adopted by Fearnley
and Beaven (2018) in the context of volcano alert systems.
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reverse communication (i.e. open dialogue) between pro-
ducers and users (Weinberg 1992; Hemlin and Rasmussen
2006). Contextualisation involves not only changes of
planned outputs and outcomes, but also changes of
analytical emphasis and methodology, in other words
production decisions (Blockley 1992; Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1993; Nowotny 2003).
Evolution
Volcanic risk governance regimes are slowly changing
and, perhaps surprisingly, the origins of change can be
traced to dates before 1996, when the US/NRC criticised
traditional linear models and advocated an analytic-de-
liberative approach. Since 1984, commentators upon vol-
canic hazards (including those listed in Additional file 3)
have advocated with increasing frequency the merits of
contextualising volcanic hazard assessments through
processes of deliberation. There is evidence of a
slow-moving, disorganised, yet perceptible, paradigm
shift from those regimes narrowly based upon linear (i.e.
non-deliberative) objectivist and decisionist governance
models to more iterative constructivist initiatives that
review the benefits and challenges of more stakeholder-
focused deliberative processes. Additional file 3 contains
a complete time-line of iterative initiatives and associ-
ated published literature.
Despite the paradigm shift noted above, advances
in expert and academia-driven Mode-1 science have
not been matched by corresponding improvements in
communication practices that help decision-makers
to make more informed risk-mitigation decisions and
better use of risk-mitigation arrangements (IFRC
2015; Preuner et al. 2017; Scolobig et al. 2017).
Critics of traditional linear models (including US/
NRC 1996; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014; Preuner
et al. 2017; Scolobig et al. 2017) have argued that
those models:
1. failed to address the questions that users see as
relevant or to reflect the perspectives and concerns
of risk management stakeholders (often described as
including ‘public officials’, ‘interested and affected
parties’, and ‘at-risk individuals’);
2. communicated unhelpful scientific information to
decision-makers leading them to make unwise
decisions;
3. confined scientific analysis to good characterisations
of volcanic behaviour;
4. failed to identify the need for, and/or
inappropriately restricted, stakeholder participation;
and
5. “significantly oversimplified the process of volcanic
risk management” (Donovan and Oppenheimer
2014, 152).
To address the perceived failings of the traditional lin-
ear models, many commentators (including those listed
in Table 2), without using variations of the word ‘contex-
tualised’, advocate scientific assessments of natural and
volcanic hazards that encompass the characteristics
listed in Table 3.
The paradigm shift towards more stakeholder-focused
deliberative processes appears to be entirely consistent
with our earlier summary of the current theoretical dis-
course about volcanic risk governance models. Further-
more, the momentum for change is increasing as
evidenced by a higher number of published research
sources addressing issues consistent with constructivist
values and, in particular, those related to the democratic
approach to cultural bias and the effectiveness of hazard
communications.
In Additional file 3, we have identified papers con-
fronting the challenges of participation, stakeholder-
needs, contextualisation, comprehensibility, credibility
and novel knowledge sources. Closer examination of the
academic background of recently-published researchers
reveals that: (1) transdisciplinary research projects are
becoming more common (e.g. VUELCO; STREVA and
DEVORA8); and (2) by inference, research funders
accept the relevance and significance of contributions
made by social scientists (e.g. the European Union’s
Framework programmes, NERC and ESRC).
Additional file 3 also demonstrates that the paradigm
shift is patchy reflecting the reality that ‘paradigm-chal-
lenging’ research projects, with limited budgets, are
often confined to small geographical areas and, for ob-
vious reasons, are more common and/or better re-
ported in affluent regions and countries (such as North
America, Europe, former European dependencies, and
New Zealand). We also acknowledge that, country-
by-country, historical and cultural differences may re-
sult in different appetites for more democratic govern-
ance initiatives. In other words, not all countries with
volcanic hazards currently embrace notions of democ-
racy, freedom of information, and active stakeholder
dialogue and participation to an equal extent.
Another lesson from the review is that there appears
to be little or no readily accessible evidence of docu-
mented protocols for more iterative processes of vol-
canic risk governance. We have found no country that
has laws and/or binding governance standards that:
(1) require the structured contextualisation of volcanic
hazard assessments or; (2) lay down, at a more granu-
lar level, ‘deliberation’ or ‘participation’ rules or guid-
ance covering matters such as: (a) which stakeholders
should be actively involved; (b) when; (c) how; and (d)
why; for example by reference to the need to make
the satisfaction of the risk-related expectations of
decision-makers of primary importance.
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The practical challenges of contextualisation
Although our theoretical choices provide a coherent
framework for hazard assessments, they create mul-
tiple challenges. These challenges need to be identi-
fied and discussed since they are relevant to the
practicalities and standards of contextualisation that
we consider later.
Simplicity, certainty, and objectivity
Even though volcanoes exist as ‘objective physical phe-
nomena’, their characterisation can never be simple or a
purely objective, value-free and quantitative activity of
discovery. Characterisations are social products (Zinn
2008) that are complex, constructed, process-related and
dynamic. They are frequently contingent upon existing
normative axioms, social conventions and syntax,
semantics, and technological pragmatics.9 There are no
existing rules that will guarantee the objectivity, truth or
reliability of contextualisation (Nowotny 2003).
Choices resulting from subjective analysis may become
critical within subsequent risk management decisions
and may be overlooked (Runge et al. 2015; Leonard et al.
2014). On the other hand, we argue that, when openly
identified and discussed, they may represent the variable,
or negotiable, aspects of scientific analysis that are inte-
gral to, and make contextualisation possible. In short,
they may contribute most directly to the utility of the
overall analytical effort.
Comprehensibility and integrity
We will refer briefly to, but will not develop, the rich
discourse that highlights the challenges of constructing
suitably comprehensive, and yet comprehensible, know-
ledge regarding the complex risk-related parameters of
volcanic hazards. By way of illustration, since 1997, if
not before, there have been lively debates about, inter alia:
(1) the differences between ‘predictions’ and ‘forecasts’; (2)
the un-achievability of precise prediction; (3) the merits of
‘deterministic’ and ‘probabilistic’ approaches to forecast-
ing; (4) the use of ‘quantitative’ and/or ‘qualitative’ met-
rics/narratives; and (5) the merits of communicating
sources of and estimates of uncertainties alongside the key
assumptions underpinning these (Klein 1997; Newhall
et al. 1999; Sparks 2003; Sparks and Aspinall 2004;
Rausand 2005; Renn 2008; Aven and Renn 2009; Donovan
and Oppenheimer 2014; Doorn 2014; Doyle et al. 2014;
Stein and Friedrich 2014; Marti 2015; Beven et al. 2015).
Many commentators10 have addressed the need for re-
liability, competence, honesty, openness and integrity
when handling the complexities, constraints and subjec-
tivities of traditional scientific analysis.11 Others have
stressed the importance of the pre-crisis relationships
within which these difficult issues can be discussed and
negotiated (e.g. Leonard et al. 2014).
Materiality
Many commentators12 have identified differences and
perceived tensions (both theoretical and practical) be-
tween ‘epistemic’ values relating to the validity, auton-
omy and objectivity of ‘reliable’ Mode-1 scientific
enquiry, and the ‘socio-political’ values of more iterative
democratic Mode-2 scientific products. The emergence
of contextualisation is therefore significant in that it
changes and makes more complex the role of analysts
(Weinberg 1972; Nowotny 2003). When described in ex-
treme terms, it changes their role of being isolated pro-
viders of off-the-peg Mode-1 ‘evidential’ truth products
judged only by their scientific excellence. Instead they
become collaborative providers of bespoke ‘problem-re-
lated’ Mode-2 value products.13
We argue that, if the competencies of reasonably com-
petent hazard assessors do not include identifying and
responding to the requirements of, and communicating
with, decision-makers, any role that involves contextual-
isation, if and when undertaken, represents a managerial
hazard posing possible managerial risks.
The need for Quality Assurance criteria
Risk governance has a critical normative/ethical dimen-
sion and, consistent with this conceptual framework,
Table 3 The characteristics of scientific assessments that will
address the perceived weaknesses of traditional risk governance
models
To address the perceived failings of the traditional models, many
commentators* advocate scientific assessments that:
• are coherent, high-quality, technically systematic, scientifically sound
and accurate, and based on a transparent, balanced and nuanced
understanding the best available science;
• reflect a change of emphasis from precision of scientific analysis to
its unprompted relevance to risk management and the need to
prevent avoidable risk-mitigation errors;
• for stakeholders, are meaningful, pertinent, tailored, targeted,
people-centred, user-driven, decision-driven, relevant to risk
decisions, reflexive (i.e. to social, economic and legal contexts and
expectations), situationally-aware, externally oriented, politically-
relevant, socially-conscious, meaningful, and effective acts of
effective communication;
• reflect an understanding of, and are driven by the needs, concerns,
mental models, expectations, social/trust/cultural requirements,
preferences, methods, expertise, capabilities, conflicts and limits of
distinct categories of stakeholders;
• integrate methods, skills and expertise across disciplinary boundaries;
• reflect fruitful two-way dialogue (i.e. deliberation, consultation and
cooperation) between stakeholders including the media and the
private sector;
• capable of independent review.
*Fiske 1984; Blockley 1992; Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, US/NRC 1996;
Newhall et al. 1999; Ronan et al. 2000; Cash et al. 2003; Nowotny 2003;
Cardona 2004; UN/ISDR 2004; G8 2005; Basher 2006; Solana et al. 2008;
Renn 2008; Walker et al. 2010; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2012;
CEOS 2013; Hicks et al. 2013; Sarrki et al 2014; Donovan and
Oppenheimer 2014; Doyle et al. 2015; Marzocchi et al. 2015; Calder et al.
2015; Komorowski et al. 2015; UN/ISDR 2015; IFRC 2015; Scolobig et al.
2017; Preuner et al. 2017; Papale 2017; Fearnley and Beaven 2018
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several commentators (e.g. Grabill and Simmons 1998;
Van Nuffelen 2004; Hemlin and Rasmussen 2006; Renn
2008; Wachinger and Renn 2010; Thompson 2012) have
advocated the need for quality norms for contextualisa-
tion.14 Our review of the published literature has identi-
fied several common themes regarding the need for, and
general character of, quality assurance criteria and these
are listed in Table 4.
The UN’s Sendai Framework prioritised pre-event risk
governance and mitigation before post-event response
and recovery. It recognised the importance of knowledge
building and promoted the utility of quality standards
for risk governance developed by technical organisations
and experts (UN/ISDR 2015).
In summary, to preserve ‘good science’, contextualisa-
tion must be actively and rationally constrained within
structured boundaries (i.e. protocols, rules and stan-
dards) that are the product of an iterative dialogue
between stakeholders including experts and decision-
makers. Yet, advocates of these boundaries provide little,
if any, guidance as to how they can be established and,
perhaps unsurprisingly, it has been argued that “novel
types of quality control probably constitute the most
controversial attribute of Mode-2 knowledge produc-
tion” (Hessels and Lente 2008, 17).
If quality standards are necessary, what standards and
processes of standardisation are considered by commen-
tators to be appropriate?
Selecting Quality Assurance criteria
A starting point is to compare Mode-1 and Mode-2
norms, which Weinberg (1972) characterised respect-
ively in terms of ‘truth’ and ‘value’. The quality control
of Mode-1 science was traditionally limited to the judge-
ment of a clearly defined community of disciplinary spe-
cialists/peers, and based upon context-free and use-free
criteria of scientific excellence (Gibbons et al. 1994). Ac-
cordingly, the goal of Mode-1 science is “getting the sci-
ence right” (US/NRC 1996) and, for Nowotny (2003),
the relevant criteria, which are epistemic, being relating
to the quantification of knowledge validity, include the
rigour, dis-interestedness, objectivity, robustness and re-
liability of scientific methods and practice. In this con-
text, reliability is defined almost exclusively in terms of
replicability.15
By contrast, the US/NRC 1996 report acknowledges
the need for additional quality criteria for Mode-2 sci-
ence, which has the twin goals of “getting the science
right” and “getting the right science”. It states that it is a
challenge “to develop reasonable standards for quantita-
tive analysis” and adds that “for both quantitative and
qualitative…analysis, technical adequacy is a necessary
but not sufficient characteristic: analysis must also be
relevant to the given risk” [emphasis added]. Supporting
this approach, Renn (2008) argues that Mode-2 contex-
tualised analyses require additional criteria of efficiency
and usefulness (i.e. criteria of impact) that reflect the
transient contexts of their application. They need to
measure the contribution of analysis to risk-mitigation
decisions as well as the satisfaction of their makers’
needs and expectations.16
Quality Assurance processes and existing standards
What process of quality assurance is best for contextual-
isation? Hemlin and Rasmussen (2006, 191) advocated a
shift of focus away from the quality ‘control’ of
post-production knowledge products by traditional aca-
demic peer reviewers using only scientific criteria that
“tested and checked how [those products] corresponded
to reality”. Instead, the objectivity, utility, social rele-
vance and authority of contextualised knowledge prod-
ucts should be established both by continuous ‘quality
monitoring’ of outputs and by ‘quality assuring’ know-
ledge production processes against general standards of
production.17
Commentators (such as US/NRC 1996; Hemlin and
Rasmussen 2006; Renn 2008; Wachinger and Renn
2010) assume that ‘general’ or ‘commonly agreed’ quality
assurance rules/standards for “fairly and accurately”
Table 4 The need for and the general scope of quality assurance
criteria
The need for quality assurance criteria
Criteria are needed to:
• Provide a structured, rational, ethical, standardised, replicable and
defensible approach to contextualisation;
• Preserve the hallmarks of good science production that include
autonomy, detachment, self-restraint, rigour, objectivity, excellence,
integrity, and reliability;
• Avoid conflicts of interest;
• Produce plural and conditional products that explicitly
communicate the “deep intractabilities” of uncertainty, ambiguity
and ignorance, instead of a single, definitive, unconditional product
(Stirling 2010);
• Recognise and value the importance of risk-mitigation effects
(i.e. outputs and outcomes);
• Help end-users to make better informed risk mitigation decisions
and better use of risk-mitigation arrangements; and
• Facilitate fair and accurate independent review.
The general character of quality assurance criteria
Quality assurance criteria should be:
• Agreed between scientists and distinct stakeholder communities;
• Articulated, internalised and continually tested;
• Objective;
• People-focussed; and
• Related the competencies needed by scientists for continuous
‘adaptation’ rather than continuous ‘improvement’ during all phases
of knowledge production.
Weinberg 1972; Bartley 1971; Gibbons et al. 1994; US/NRC 1996;
Shackley and Wynne 1996; Grabill and Simmons 1998; Nowotny 2003;
Van Nuffelen 2004; Hemlin and Rasmussen 2006; Renn 2008; Hessels
and Lente 2008; Wachinger and Renn 2010; Stirling 2010; OECD 2015;
Preuner et al. 2017; Scolobig et al. 2017; Papale 2017.
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testing scientific assessments and products (such as vol-
canic hazards assessments) exist and can be readily
found. They allude indirectly to the problem of quality
‘standard equivocality’ that was considered by Bretton
et al. (2015) who: (1) argued that objectively measuring
the methodological rigour of volcanic hazard assessments
(i.e. validating against standards of quality) may present a
challenge; and (2) noted that geo-science disciplines in
general (and geology/volcanology in particular) and re-
lated practices (such as those of ‘geoscientists’ and ‘geolo-
gists’) are not regulated in most countries and there are
currently no readily accessible international standards of
good practice.18
The ‘equilibrium of contextualisation’ – an introduction
Developing the notion of ‘standard equivocality’, we here
investigate further the direct and indirect consequences of
the scrutinised environment within which decision-makers
operate. At least nine sources have the potential to influ-
ence the quality norms of contextualisation, and thereby
drive the processes, outputs and outcomes of contextualisa-
tion. They are characterised here as manifestations of: (1)
regulatory standards; (2) natural and operational con-
straints; and (3) stakeholder pressures. In Fig. 1 we intro-
duce the concept of the ‘equilibrium of contextualisation’
that reflects the product of these influences. In the follow-
ing discussion we introduce each class of influence separ-
ately before considering the effect of ‘standard equivocality’.
Regulatory standards
In this context and for the purposes of this paper, ‘regu-
lation’ means the purposeful control or management of
contextualisation that may come in a variety of forms
(ranging from slow-changing, rigid, top-down, struc-
tured rules to dynamic, organic, bottom-up informal
guidance), and from several sources. Six possible sources
of regulatory standards are shown in Table 5.
Constraints
‘Natural’ constraints result from the fact that, because “a
universal model to understand the behaviour of volcanoes
does not exist” (Marti 2015, 372), governance of volcanic
risks inevitably involves characterisation of “an inherently
complex reality” (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993, 744).
Fig. 1 Contextualisation in Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Key: Examples of possible influences, constraints and pressures are given; Hazard Assessments (HA); Decision-makers (DM); Contextualisation is in
‘equilibrium’ when there is ‘balance’ between the influences of quality standards (regulation), natural and operational constraints (reality) and
stakeholder pressures (deregulation). Balance is achieved when regulatory sources are effective, quality standards are unequivocal and enforced,
within natural and operational constraints stakeholder pressures are addressed, and structured contextualisation preserves scientific
methodologies and probity. Disequilibrium and imbalance may result when regulatory sources are ineffective, quality standards are equivocal or
unenforced, within natural and operational constraints stakeholder pressures are not addressed, and ad hoc contextualisation fails to preserve
traditional standards of scientific probity
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‘Operational’ constraints, which may be the most sig-
nificant during an emerging period of volcanic unrest,
include those of resources and time. Nowotny (2003) re-
fers to the influence of funding and funders, available re-
sources and, critically, the ability to increase resources
during a crisis (e.g. the number of competent scientists
and monitoring equipment). Resource and time con-
straints may have a direct influence on what may be
realistic in terms of the scope and depth of analysis.
They may also drive or limit contextualisation, for ex-
ample the choice of data generation and monitoring op-
tions in the light of the risk-driven contexts including
stakeholders’ preferences.19
A dynamic tension may sometimes exist between the
constraints (natural and operational) and some of the
regulatory influences. By way of example, if one adopts a
working assumption that the resources for scientific ana-
lysis are usually fixed or inflexible, a scientist may have
only a limited number of analytical options from which
to select when faced with the requirements of a demand-
ing decision-maker. These options are likely to affect the
detail, scope and/or timing of contextualised output. A
negotiated balance must be achieved and the pragmatic
contextualisation of the variable/negotiable elements of
analysis will be the constructed product of deliberation.
Adopting the sentiments of Jasanoff (2010), the nuanced
product will bear the fingerprints of both scientist and
decision-maker.20
Stakeholder pressures
Decision-makers frequently request certainty, agreement
and consensus from their advisers, and have their own
standards, requirements and expectations that they may
seek to impose without open discussion and agree-
ment.21 Unsurprisingly, those same stakeholders may
make it perfectly clear what they want to hear from their
advisers to suit their overall approach to risk-related is-
sues and risk mitigation.22 Maintenance of traditional
standards of scientific probity may therefore be difficult.
The equilibrium of contextualisation - the effect of quality
‘standard equivocality’
The ‘equilibrium’ of contextualisation is the product of
the regulatory standards, natural and organisational con-
straints, and decision-maker pressures (i.e. the variables)
already referred to. The equilibrium is ‘dynamic’ (or
quasi-static) in that, at any moment in time, the influ-
ence of variables in one direction is in aggregate balance
with any counter-influences (Oxford University Press
2005). It is also ‘metastable’ in the sense that, when in-
fluential variables change, there may be resulting ‘dis-
equilibrium’ and ‘imbalance’ and the former state of
‘equilibrium’ and ‘balance’ may be not reinstated. If it is
assumed that regulatory standards and natural con-
straints are relatively constant, the most significant vari-
ables are likely to be operational constraints and
stakeholder pressures, and, for obvious reasons, these
may often be convolved.
Rothstein et al. (2006) describe an ‘early stage’ societal
risk governance environment with few pressures from
external regulation and self-regulation. Under such con-
ditions there are few incentives to proceduralise societal
risk governance activities. Governance actions tend to be
“ad hoc, methodologically diverse and determined by con-
tingent organisational pressures and ways of working”
(Rothstein et al. 2006, 9; Bretton et al. 2015). Adopting
Rothstein’s model and for the purposes of this paper, we
argue that contextualisation is in ‘equilibrium’ when there
is ‘balance’ between the influences of quality standards
(regulation), natural and operational constraints (reality)
and stakeholder pressures (deregulation). Balance is
Table 5 Contextualisation - Six possible sources of regulatory standards
External regulation Sources, including national and international legal standards, that are situated entirely external to the risk
governance stakeholders involved. Further details are in Table 1.
Collective or self-regulation Technical and ethical standards determined by bodies of practitioners and experts (e.g. professional
self-regulated associations) situated within the risk governance process. Bretton et al. (2015) noted that the
International Association of Volcanology and Chemistry (IAVCEI) report entitled “Professional conduct of
scientists during volcanic crises” (Newhall et al. 1999) is a rare example of an attempt to issue
authoritative 'self-regulating' standards.
Employer regulation Standards established by government agencies and other employers that must be followed by individuals
due to their contractual employment or engagement.
Bretton et al. (2015) differentiate between self-regulation standards and those dictated by employers.
Personal regulation Individuals' personal standards based upon moral and ethical codes not dictated by their employers
or outside agencies.
Expert regulation 'Traditional' standards of methodological probity for Mode-1 science determined by ad hoc communities
of disciplinary specialists/peers. These standards were described by Weinberg (1972) and Nowotny (2003)
respectively as the “criteria of traditional scientific excellence and quality control” and the “canons of
scientific discipline”.
Negotiated regulation Stakeholder-negotiated standards that are the product of iterative processes of deliberation.
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achieved when regulatory sources are effective, quality
standards are unequivocal and enforced, within natural
and operational constraints stakeholder pressures are ad-
dressed, and structured contextualisation preserves scien-
tific methodologies and probity.
The L’Aquila trial highlights the practical difficulties
of contextualisation. Alexander (2014a)23 has analysed
the influence of multiple cultural, political, social and
scientific factors before, during and after the disaster,
and the complexities of risk governance regimes involv-
ing government entities at national, regional and local
levels (Alexander 2010, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Gabrielli
and Bucci 2014). Butti (2016) records that Italy’s Appeal
Court noted that science communication plays a key
role in public safety management. Accordingly, that
court accepted that communicators of scientific know-
ledge have a legal duty to make communications of sci-
ence “transparent and precise in their content as well
as clear and understandable in their style” (Butti 2016).
On the facts determined by the lower court, the Appeal
Court confirmed that the public officer, who acted as
the science communicator, was guilty of “negligence
and imprudence” in making a series of reassuring and
unnecessarily informal comments to a television jour-
nalist, before a meeting of experts, and inviting at-risk
people to toast with a famous local wine.
The L’Aquila prosecution was based on alleged facts
consistent with a triumph of ‘stakeholder pressures’
(i.e. scientists saying what influential stakeholders
wanted them to say) over ‘expert regulation’ (i.e.
scientists saying what independent experts would con-
sider was justified by the available scientific evidence
and in the light of tried and tested scientific method-
ologies) in the absence of binding or influential regu-
lation. In summary, it was alleged that a hazard
communication had breached standards of contextual-
isation required by Italian criminal law – binding
standards, which were capable of identification at the
trial but, for several reasons, were either unknown or
ineffective before the tragedy.
As illustrated in Fig. 1, we conclude that ‘disequilib-
rium’ and ‘imbalance’ may result when regulatory
sources are ineffective, quality standards are equivocal
or unenforced, within natural and operational con-
straints stakeholder pressures are not addressed, and
ad hoc contextualisation fails to preserve traditional
standards of scientific probity.
Misuse of the word ‘contextualisation’
We argue that contextualisation, when properly used, is the
negotiated product of open and transparent deliberation
with stakeholders for the purpose of their risk-related uses.
Accordingly, it does not include the covert, intentional or
reckless manipulation of the content and/or timing of
hazard communications in order: (1) to influence the na-
ture and/or timing of the choices that must be made by risk
mitigation decision-makers between multiple possible ac-
tions; (2) to reflect the interests of commercial, ideological,
religious or local communities; or (3) to incorporate
precautionary, conservative, ‘blame-related’ or tactical con-
siderations. In this regard, we appreciate that there is a fine
dividing line between, on the one hand, contributing to-
wards the characterisation of the temporal, spatial and
physical parameters of volcanic hazards and the identifica-
tion and assessment of a ‘range’ of related hazard-informed
risk mitigation ‘options’ and, on the other hand, actively
advocating or influencing ‘particular’ risk mitigation ‘deci-
sions’ that depend inevitably upon socio-political factors,
contexts, values and benefit/burden trade-offs.
Recommendations for confronting the challenges
of contextualisation: Quality assurance standards
for a more structured approach
Our theoretical choices provide a reasoned foundation
for contextualised hazard assessments at the volcanic
hazard-risk interface. We argue that contextualisations
conducted by volcanologists must be carefully con-
strained within negotiated boundaries assured by quality
processes and standards, and make specific recommen-
dations to facilitate a more structured approach.
Good governance of volcanic risks dictates that quality
assurance standards for contextualisation should strive:
1. to respect any relevant ‘external’ regulation and
‘self-regulation’ standards;
2. to be derived from an open, transparent and
continuing dialogue (an iterative process) between
all relevant risk stakeholders, including scientists;
3. to identify, record and preserve certain values
perceived as critical to ‘reliable’ scientific analysis; and
4. to identify, record and foster relationships between
volcanologists and the stakeholders that use their
services, and to enhance the status and utility of
those services.
Fischhoff (2013, 14037) suggests that communication
is adequate if it meets materiality, proximity, and com-
prehensibility standards (see Table 2 for further details
of these factors and others discussed in this paragraph).
Based upon our review of the discourse focussing upon
the characteristics of hazard communication, we have
concluded that communications should recognise and
foster key relationships, and thereby generate shared un-
derstandings (i.e. mental models) and constructive senti-
ments of trust and confidence. We therefore advocate a
fourth ‘integrity’ standard that would: (1) complement
Fischhoff ’s three standards; (2) incorporate the qualities of
credibility and legitimacy favoured by Cash et al. (2003)
Bretton et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2018) 7:9 Page 12 of 20
and Sarrki et al. (2014); and (3) provide a more complete
suite of standards to monitor, audit; and, if possible, en-
hance the overall quality of hazard assessments.
We have struggled with the need for a fifth standard to
safeguard those values perceived as critical to ‘reliable’ sci-
entific analysis. To resolve this dilemma, we revisited the
commentaries of those who wish to preserve certain
values attributed by them to the rigour, reliability and ro-
bustness of the disciplines of Mode-1 science. Their lexi-
con alluded to notions of detachment, dis-interestedness,
autonomy, objectivity and self-restraint.
We have concluded that a fifth standard would be
cumbersome and is unnecessary as Mode-1 science
methodologies and behaviours can addressed adequately
by, and are in fact integral to, more granular criteria that
would properly form the substance of an integrity
standard. To put it another way, most, if not all, of the
qualities that are likely to be valued by decision-makers
(such as competence, comprehensiveness, robustness,
objectivity, fairness, transparency, openness and reliabil-
ity) are hallmarks of integrity, and the building blocks of
trust, legitimacy and credibility.
We accept that the utility of scientific knowledge
should be established by the continuous quality ‘moni-
toring’ of not only ‘outputs’ (i.e. knowledge products)
but also quality ‘assuring’ the knowledge production
‘processes’ that are claimed to be scientific. Accordingly,
quality assurance has a remit that reaches beyond analyt-
ical ‘output’ improvement and includes continuous ana-
lytical ‘process’ adaption. We thus advocate the four
quality assurance standards detailed in Table 6.
Conclusions
A weak social constructivist approach to risk governance,
which embraces relativist knowledge communication,
provides a coherent theoretical framework for the com-
munication of unavoidable scientific complexities and
uncertainties at the volcanic hazard-risk interface.
Within an iterative, non-linear, analytic-deliberative
model, the communication of knowledge is integral to
all parts of governance, and the capacities, expectations,
sentiments and actions of decision-makers thus become
not just relevant but paramount. Assessments of vol-
canic hazards should no longer assume an intrinsic sta-
tus or functional role. Any status or role should reflect
the existence and qualities of ‘relationships’ between
volcanologists and decision-makers, and be derived
from, and a consequence of, the subsequent sentiments
and behaviours of decision-makers.
If it is accepted that decision-makers and their knowledge
requirements are important, hazard assessments must be
contextualised to make them more risk-decision focussed.
If they are not already open post-L'Aquila, the black boxes
of hazard analysis and communication must be opened so
that their respective roles and risk-governance impacts can
be reappraised. Although there is evidence of a slow shift
towards initiatives assessing more iterative forms of govern-
ance, the processes of deliberation being used seem to lack
formal recorded structures. Insufficient guidance exists for
managing the practicalities and standards of hazard con-
textualisation and, to investigate these issues, we introduce
two novel concepts. The ‘scrutiny dimension’ of risk
governance is the slow-changing regulatory context that
may influence the ‘managerial dimension’ of risk and,
thereby, the dynamics of contextualisation. The metastable
‘equilibrium of contextualisation’ explains the consequences
of the quality ‘standard equivocality’ identified by Bretton
et al. (2015).
To preserve core values of traditional scientific prob-
ity, many commentators have argued that contextualisa-
tion conducted by scientists must be constrained within
certain boundaries. They have given little, if any, guid-
ance as to how these boundaries can be established,
however. In response to the challenge posed by this la-
cuna, we argue that the working practices of contextual-
isation must be more structured, and should strive to be
open, transparent and fully articulated. Contextualisa-
tion, that meets our proposed quality assurance stan-
dards of materiality, proximity, comprehensibility and
integrity may enhance hazard assessments and, thereby,
the utility of their applications (outputs) and impact of
those outputs (outcomes). Utility and impact should be
measured by reference to the sentiments and actions of
decision-makers.
Endnotes
1The second paper is “Hazard communication by vol-
canologists: Part 2 - Quality standards for volcanic haz-
ard assessments” [Bretton et al, J Appl. Volcanol. DOI
10.1186/s13617-018-0079-8, 2018]
2Analyses of the past and present, and statements re-
garding the future, are very difficult because “a universal
model to understand behaviour of volcanoes does not
exist” (Marti 2015, 372). “Each volcano has its own pe-
culiarities depending on magma variables…rock rhe-
ology, stress field, geodynamic environment and local
geology” (Marti 2015, 372). Even though volcanoes
are notoriously individualistic, with ‘Jekyll and Hyde’
personalities, past volcanic activity is not always a good
guide to the future (Fournier d'Albe 1979; Francis and
Oppenheimer 2004; Sparks et al. 2013).
3E.g. those involving data sources and key value assump-
tions, models, conditions, constraints and limitations.
4Our choices are made at a time when objectivist and
decisionist approaches to risk governance, which are
based upon the assumption of an achievable segregation
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of ‘context and value-free’ and ‘context and value-rich’
domains, are under pressure (Fischer 2000; Pielke 2004;
IRGC 2005; Renn 2008; Millstone 2009). Specifically, the
current role of volcanologists, when acting as hazard an-
alysts, appears to some commentators from both general
scientific and geo-scientific backgrounds to be divisive,
blurred, porous and confused (Peterson 1996; Nowotny
2003; Renn 2008; Ronan et al. 2000; Stirling 2010;
Donovan and Oppenheimer 2012; Marzocchi et al. 2012;
Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014; Bretton et al. 2015;
OECD 2015).
5Peterson 1996; Nowotny 2003; Renn 2008; Ronan
et al. 2000; Stirling 2010; Donovan and Oppenheimer
2012, Marzocchi et al. 2012; Donovan and Oppenheimer
2014; Bretton et al. 2015; OECD 2015
6Citing Longino (1993), Schwandt refers to problem of
uniting the descriptive and the normative and describes
weak constructivism as “modest contextual empiricism”
– one in which the real world constrains our knowledge
construction (Schwandt 2000, 199).
7These three [dimensions of risk] all contribute to at-
tempts to estimate or grade risk. In risk analysis, the con-
text (management capacity and related actors) determines
the limits, the reasons, the purpose and the interactions to
be considered. Analysis has to be congruent with the con-
text and this must be taken into account when analysing
the sum of the contributing factors. If not, the analysis
would be totally irrelevant or useless (Cardona 2004, 47).
8DEVORA is a multi-agency, multi-disciplinary collab-
orative research programme which is led by volcanologists
at the University of Auckland and GNS Science.
9Weinberg 1972; Freudenburg 1988; Horlick-Jones 1998;
Funtowicz and Ravetz 1990; Wynne 1992; Funtowicz and
Ravetz 1992; Gibbons et al. 1994; Laudan 1996; Bruijn and
ten Heuvelhof 1999; Lupton 1999; Van Asselt and Rotmans
2002; Jasanoff 2002; Merz and Thieken 2005; IRGC 2005;
Renn 2008; Mellor 2008; Parascandola 2010; Jasanoff 2010;
Spieghalter and Riesch 2011; Aspinall and Cooke 2013;
Rougier 2013; Rougier and Beven 2013; Hincks et al. 2014;
Cornell and Jackson 2013; Freer et al. 2013; Beven et al.
2015; OECD 2015.
10Renn and Levine 1991; Siegrist and Cvekovich 2000;
Frewer et al. 2003; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003; Poortinga
et al. 2004; Siegrist and Gutscher 2006; Hemlin and
Rasmussen 2006, 188; Pielke 2007; Wilson et al. 2007;
Eiser et al. 2009; Renn 2008; Haynes et al. 2008b; Doyle
and Johnston 2011; Fischhoff 2013; Ulusoy 2012; Owen
et al. 2013; IAVCEI 2013 Newsletter No. 4; Sparks et al.
2013; Siegrist 2014; Pierson et al. 2014; Potter et al. 2014;
Leonard et al. 2014; Donovan and Oppenheimer 2014;
Doyle et al. 2015; Christie et al. 2015; OECD 2015; Mothes
et al. 2015; Scolobig et al. 2017; Preuner et al. 2017
11Pierson et al. (2014, 21), citing Pielke (2007),
Haynes et al. (2008b), argue that four qualities exhib-
ited by scientists enhance their trustworthiness in the
eyes of the public. These are: (1) reliability (i.e.
consistency and dependability in what they say), (2)
competence (i.e. having the skills and ability to do the
job); (3) openness (i.e. having a relaxed, straightfor-
ward attitude and being able to mix well and become
‘part of the community’); and (4) integrity (i.e. having
an impartial and independent stance). On a similar
note, the OECD (2015, 34) noted “it should be recog-
nised that openness and transparency are important
elements in maintaining public trust in scientific ad-
vice during crises”.
12Such as Voight 1996; Grabill and Simmons 1998; Van
Nuffelen 2004; Hemlin and Rasmussen 2006; Renn 2008;
Wachinger and Renn 2010
13Van Nuffelen (2004) refers to “inevitable communi-
cation problems” and the practical and cognitive difficul-
ties of “scholastic distortion”.
14These norms have been referred to as rules for how
science is conducted (Grabill and Simmons 1998), an
ethical threshold for scientific investigation (Van Nuffelen
2004), commonly agreed standards of validation (Renn
2008), benchmarks and performance standards (Hemlin
and Rasmussen 2006), and integration rules and standards
(Wachinger and Renn 2010). The US/NRC's definition
of analysis expressly acknowledges that there may be
“strong practical reasons for standardised, replicable and
defensible analytic procedures…capable of independent
review” (US/NRC 1996 102).
15On a similar note, Renn (2008) states that analytical
competence is typically evaluated by criteria and estab-
lished rules that have been developed within the respect-
ive disciplines from which the analytical theories and
methods originate.
Table 6 Four quality assurance standards for the contextualising volcanic hazard assessments
Standard (the first three from Fischhoff 2013) Purpose
Materiality To promote the paramount status of users’ needs, which may reflect competing demands related
to the speed, scope and precision of scientific advice required.
Proximity To promote effective user-access to scientific advice in both time and space.
Comprehensibility To ensure users can readily extract sufficient meaning from scientific advice.
Integrity To nurture the willingness of users to receive and trust scientific advice and make informed
decisions based upon the quality of existing relationships.
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16Renn (2008) is more specific arguing that deliberation
can assist scientific analysis in several ways. Deliberation
can enhance analysis by incorporating information from
disparate sources including local, indigenous, experiential
and circumstantial knowledge sources Such as those
championed by Baxter et al. (1998), Loughlin et al. (2002),
Cronin et al. (2004a, 2004b), Cashman and Giordano
(2008), Mercer and Kelman (2010), McCall and
Peters-Guarin (2012), Cornell and Jackson (2013) and
Pardo et al. (2015); representing an indirect endorsement
of our materiality and integrity standards. Deliberation
can determine what kind of analysis a risk-mitigation deci-
sion requires (a direct reference to the need for material-
ity), and whether that analysis is appropriately balanced
(an indirect reference to a need for integrity). Lastly, delib-
eration can determine how to communicate “user–
friendly” (i.e. bespoke as opposed to one-size-fits all) ana-
lytical results – an indirect reference to our materiality,
comprehensibility and proximity standards.
17Renn (2008, 275) refers to evidence claims, such as
hazard communications, being “fairly and accurately
tested against commonly agreed standards of validation”.
The US/NRC's definition of analysis, summarised in
[Additional file 1], expressly acknowledges that there
may be “strong practical reasons for standardised, replic-
able and defensible analytic procedures…capable of inde-
pendent review”.
18Addressing the same issue, other commentators refer
to the “maturity of scientific knowledge” and acknow-
ledge that many “decision options require systematic
knowledge that is not available, still in its infancy or in
an intermediate status” (Renn 2008, 292; Starr and
Whipple 1980; Horlick-Jones 1998; Horlick-Jones 2007).
In apparent support for the above sentiments, and to
put in context their recommendations for volcanic haz-
ard map standards, it is telling that Leonard et al. (2014)
noted a lack of relevant authoritative international guid-
ance in their 2012 Tongariro eruption crisis case study.
19Weinberg (1992) refers to the need for ‘engineering
judgement’ when decisions must be made on incomplete
data and constrained by time and resource limitations. A
judgement of this nature is a good example of unstruc-
tured contextualisation; however, great care must be
taken to distinguish between, and not to misuse, the
terms ‘engineering judgement’ and ‘expert judgement’.
The latter is not arbitrary, having to satisfy various fun-
damental principles (Skipp 1993).
20By way of illustration, it might be agreed that it
would be appropriate to prioritise certain analytical ac-
tivities, and/or to target areas of greatest perceived soci-
etal risk exposure or vulnerability, such as a particular
valley, an area of high population/vulnerability, or critical
infrastructure sites (e.g. a bridge, dam, desalination plant,
hospital or airport).For contextualised communication,
the issues to be addressed would include: (1) analytical
content – format, numerical and narrative expressions of
probability and analytical confidence, assumptions, jargon
and graphics; (2) ancillary advice – the adequacy, location
and funding of monitoring resources, hazard and risk
mitigation and monitoring safety; and (3) delivery – tim-
ing, means, givers and receivers (see e.g. Jolly and Cronin
2014).
21(McGuire and Kilburn 1997; Paton et al. 1998, 1999,
2000; WBGU 2000; Aspinall 2011; Donovan and Oppen-
heimer 2012; Jolly and Cronin 2014).
22Stirling (2010) notes that policy-makers often prefer
expert advice presented as a “single ‘definitive’ interpret-
ation”. He warns that, in response, there is a tendency
for scientists to reach and present a consensus opinion
and, not only to understate uncertainties within quanti-
tative advice, but to present qualitative advice that un-
derstates ambiguities and ignorance, and contains
aggregated beliefs.
23Alexander 2014a, 1 “…transforming the findings of
earth sciences…into information that can be used to
protect citizens”
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